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Mr. Jensen's stock in the company should be divided between the parties. However, the 
formula used by the court failed to take into account the interest in the company of other 
individuals and resulted in Ms. Jensen being awarded much more than would Jhave 
resulted in the division the court intended. Did the court err when it applied the formula it 
did in dividing the increase in equity? 
In its Findings of Fact, the court below found that Clara Jensen's interest in 
the company does not pass to Mr. Jensen until the time of Clara Jensen's death. Yet in its 
Conclusions of Law the court awards to Ms. Jensen a portion of the increase in the stock 
of the company that is associated with Clara Jensen's shares, thus awarding to Ms. Jensen 
property that does not belong to either of the parties to the divorce. Did the court err 
when it awarded to Ms. Jensen property that belongs to an individual not a party to the 
divorce? 
In its Conclusions of Law, the court below properly sited Mortensen v. 
Mortensen as the ruling law in this matter, yet the court failed to follow the rule laid out 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Mortensen. The court also misapplied precedential cases 
to the facts of this case. Did the court err when it failed to apply the rule of Mortensen 
after correctly stating it as the law governing this case, and when it applied to the facts of 
this case the outcome of cases that are not analogous to it? 
The court below awarded attorney fees to Ms. Jensen without inquiring or 
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making findings concerning Ms. Jensen's financial need, Mr. Jensen's ability to pay, or 
the reasonableness of the fees. Did the court err when it awarded attorney fees? 
Standards of Review 
The trial court's property division is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Whether the 
trial court's findings of fact in support an award of attorney's fees are sufficient is a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal concerns the divorce of Kae Jensen ("Ms. Jensen") and David 
Jensen ("Mr. Jensen"). On November 27, 2006 the trial court entered Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Decree of Divorce. The 
parties were married in November, 1998, separated in January, 2004, and were 
divorced on May 16, 2005. By the time of trial both parties were remarried to other 
individuals. 
At the time of the marriage Mr. Jensen owned stock in a closely held family 
company, A & D Jensen Contractors, Inc. ("the company") along with his brother, 
father, mother and uncle. Also, prior to the marriage, in 1985 the company purchased 
the stock of Mr. Jensen's uncle which stock was held in the company as treasury stock 
during the marriage. 
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In 1989 Mr. Jensen's father died. Mr. Jensen's mother, Clara Jensen, 
acquired ownership of his shares. In 1999, Clara Jensen assigned her shares to Mr. 
Jensen and his brother Mark Jensen in order that her personal assets would not have to 
be pledged as collateral when the company borrowed funds. However, Clara Jensen 
retained ownership of the shares and the trial court found that the assignment would 
not constitute a transfer of the stock until the time of her death. The court also 
recognized an ownership interest in the company by Mark Jensen. 
Mr. Jensen worked for the company during the period of the marriage. Ms. 
Jensen went to school and owned and operated a massage business during the 
marriage. 
Although the trial court seems to recognize numerous owners of the 
company, it ruled that half the increase in the adjusted value of the company be 
awarded to Ms. Jensen. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point One 
The trial court ruled that the increase in equity of Mr. Jensen's stock should 
be split between the parties. However, the court failed to take into account other 
owners of the company, thus dividing the increase as though all the stock belonged to 




The trial court found that Clara Jensen's interest in the company would not 
pass to Mr. Jensen until the time of her death. Yet, the court awarded to Ms. Jensen 
an increase in the value of the stock that is ascribable to shares the court found to be 
Clara Jensen's. Thus the court awarded to Ms. Jensen property that does not belong to 
either party to the divorce. 
Point Three 
The trial court sited Mortensen v. Mortensen as the Supreme Court precedent 
driving the rule of this case. However the court's rulings ignored the rule laid down in 
Mortensen. Further, the court sites a number of cases in support of its ruling that Ms. 
Jensen's role as primary care-giver to the couple's child and her contribution to 
household responsibilities entitle her to a full half share in the company's increase in 
value over the years of the marriage. However these cases do not support the court's 
ruling. 
Point Four 
The trial court awarded attorney fees to Ms. Jensen. However, the trial court 
made no inquiry nor findings concerning Ms. Jensen's financial need, Mr. Jensen's 




The trial court erred when it calculated the division of the increase 
in the company's equity 
In its Conclusions of Law, the court below ruled that the increase in equity 
of Mr. Jensen's stock in the company should be divided between the parties. 
Conclusions of Law f 22. The court then promulgated the following formula to 
effectuate this division: 
[C]hange in adjusted total equity less the 75% of the credit card debt 
that respondent should pay, less the attorney's fees that Respondent should 
pay, and less the value of the Petitioner's business. ($230,851 -18,724.68 
- $12,562.50 - $5,000 = $194,563.82) This number should be divided by 
two, which represents each party's share of equity. ($194,563.82 / 2 = 
$97,381.91) 
A/, at f 23. 
The court then awarded Ms. Jensen $97,281.91 as her share of the increase in value 
of Mr. Jensen's stock. Id. at f 24. 
The court is in error. Instead of dividing Mr. Jensen's portion of the increase in equity 
between the parties, the court has divided the entire increase in equity. This includes the 
value of shares not found to be owned by Mr. Jensen. While the court makes no specific 
findings as to ownership of the company stock, it does seem to accept that there is at least 
one other owner and possibly two. Id. at f^f 30 - 46. 
POINT II 
The trial court assigned to Ms. Jensen property that belongs to an individual not a 
party to the divorce 
The trial court found that Mr. Jensen's mother, Clara Jensen, had earmarked her 
50% share in the company to be devised to Mr. Jensen and his brother Mark Jensen upon 
her death as their inheritance from her estate. Supplemental Findings of Fact <|ff 44, 45. 
The court found that Clara Jensen "assigned" her shares to Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen 
so that her assets would be protected from the company's liabilities. Id. at *f 44. The 
court heard testimony that this method of asset protection was neither unusual among 
closely held companies such as this one, nor fraudulent. Trial Transcript, July 31, 2006, 
pp. 12-13,11. 23. Accordingly, the court found that this "assignment" would not constitute 
a "complete transfer" of her interest in the company to Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen until 
the time of her death. Supplemental Findings of Fact, f^ 45. 
The court then ruled that the entire increase in equity of the company during the 
time of the marriage be divided between the parties. Supplemental Conclusions of Law f^ 
22. The court is in error since, for assets to be distributed as marital property, the assets 
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must be in the legal possession of one, or both, of the marital parties. Enrody v. Enrody, 
914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Here, it appears that legal possession of the 
stock remains with Clara Jensen. In any case, the court does not specifically find 
otherwise. By way of illustrating the court's error in awarding away Clara Jensen's 
property, if she so pleased, Clara Jensen presumably could change her mind about leaving 
her stock to Mr. Jensen and could leave it instead to someone else or dispose of it in some 
other way. 
POINT III 
The Trial Court Ignored the rule of law laid out by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, and misapplied other precedents 
The trial court sited Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), as the 
Supreme Court precedent driving the rule of this case. Supplemental Conclusions of 
Law, f 21. However the court's rulings ignored the rule laid down in Mortensen. 
Further, the court sites a number of cases in support of its ruling that Ms. Jensen's role as 
primary care-giver to the couple's child and her contribution to household responsibilities 
entitle her to a full half share in the company's increase in value over the years of the 
marriage. Id. at 22. As will be discussed below, these cases do not support the court's 
ruling. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen does not support the trial court's ruling 
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The trial court correctly sites Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 
1988), for the proposition that a party's separate property acquired by gift should be 
awarded to the party. (Supplemental Conclusions of Law f 21.) However, the court then 
erroneously enlists Mortensen and three other cases to support awarding Ms. Jensen a 
portion of the increase in value that occurred during the marriage. Id at f^ 22. 
In Mortensen, the Utah Supreme Court laid out the rule for courts making 
property divisions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5. "[TJrial courts making 
"equitable" property division...should...generally award property acquired by one spouse 
by gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to 
that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless...the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, 
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it....The remaining 
property should be divided equitably between the parties as in other divorce cases...." 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (other exceptions to the general 
rule not relied upon by the trial court are omitted from the quoted material). 
Ironically, the Mortensen court let stand an unequal division of marital 
property. However, the Court based its affirmance, not on one of the exceptions to the 
general rule it had laid out, but rather on the fact that it was not the trial court who had 
made the property division. Id. at 309. The unfortunate appellant had stipulated to a 
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property division that awarded him personal property in stock in a family farm but offset 
that with a division of the remaining property that the appellant felt was less than he was 
entitled to. Id. 
"Since the trial court did not actually make the division of property here but 
only accepted the division made by the parties themselves," the Supreme Court explained, 
"we cannot presume that had the court made the division, it would have fallen into error." 
Id. In explaining that the division was not facially inequitable, the Court pointed out that, 
for her part in the stipulated settlement, the appellee wife had waived all right to alimony. 
Id. 
Thus, while Mortensen is a proper statement of the rule the court should have 
followed when dividing the property in the present case, its facts do not provide any 
rationale for deviating from the general rule and awarding Ms. Jensen half the increase in 
value of the company that occurred during the marriage. 
The court below cites three additional cases in support of its ruling that Ms. 
Jensen is entitled to half the increase of the company's value. The court made no attempt 
to analyze these cases or to explain why they should determine the outcome under the 
facts of this case. Each case will be discussed below. 
Elman v. Elman is not analogous to the present case 
In Elman the husband had acquired interests in family real estate partnerships. 
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Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176, 2002 UT App 83, *h 3 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). In awarding a 
"small share of the appreciation on Husband's partnership interest/' to the wife, the court 
first pointed to the fact that the couple had jointly agreed that the wife would quit her 
career in property management in order to manage the couple's sizeable marital 
properties. Id. at f^ 4. 
"She secured land for, and was in charge of, building the parties' Park City 
home. The home increased in value from $685,000 to over $1,000,000 at the time of 
trial. Additionally, Wife located, sold, and traded other marital properties. In particular, 
she was involved in the acquisition of a Montana ranch, which increased in value by 
approximately $442,000 at the time of trial; a Park City lot that sold for a $30,000 profit; 
and a lot, valued at $895,000, which she traded for a lot in the Colony at the Canyons..., 
valued at $1,200,000 at the time of trial." Id 
These marital assets, which the court found the wife had grown, were awarded 
50% to the husband. Id. at f 24. Thus, the court found it "only equitable, given the 
unusual responsibilities she assumed, that Wife share in the appreciation on the properties 
Husband grew during the marriage." Id. 
While the court deemed these unusual facts of the wife managing and growing 
sizeable marital assets an "extraordinary situation" where equity demanded an award of 
the husband's separate property to the wife, it nevertheless made only a "small and 
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narrowly drawn award based on the years of Husband's most active partnership 
management and only above a reasonable rate of appreciation." Id.at f 26. Unlike the 
present case in which the trial court awarded to the wife half of the asset's appreciation, 
the Elman court subtracted from the award appreciation due to inflation by subtracting 
from the award a reasonable rate of return. 
The Elman court awarded the wife a share of the husband's non-marital 
property's appreciation because the case was a truly extraordinary situation in which, by 
mutual agreement of the parties, the wife quit her career in order to take on the 
considerable job of managing the couple's sizeable property assets. Furthermore, by the 
wife's efforts, those assets greatly increased in value. The court here sites Elman as 
authority for awarding Ms. Jensen with half of the appreciation of the company's value. 
Supplemental Conclusions of Law, <f 22. 
The court invokes Elman for authority to deem the increase in the company's 
value over the course of the marriage as marital property where Ms. Jensen took "upon 
herself the household responsibilities and care of the child." Supplemental Conclusions of 
Law ]f 22. But Elman does not support such an outcome. Unlike in Elman, there is 
nothing extraordinary about the present case justifying the court's award to Ms. Jensen of 
half the appreciation of the non-marital property. Unlike Ms. Elman, Ms. Jensen 
continued to work outside the home throughout the marriage. Supplemental Findings of 
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Fact f 13 - 15. The business she ran was not incorporated into the divided marital assets 
but remained her own non-marital property. Supplemental Conclusion of law If 19. 
Furthermore, even under the extraordinary facts of Elman, the court did not 
award the wife half the appreciation of the business over the entire period of the marriage. 
Rather, the court awarded a small portion of the increase, removing from the wife's share 
that increase resulting from inflation, and awarded a share of the increase extending over 
only a part of the marriage. 
Savage v. Savage and Lee v. Lee predate and violate the rule laid 
out in Mortensen v. Mortensen 
The court sites to Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1983), and 
Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for support of its ruling that the increase 
in the company's value over the course of the marriage is marital property since the wife 
took on household responsibilities and care of the child. Supplemental Conclusions of 
Law ^ 22. But both these cases were decided prior to the rule enunciated in Mortensen v. 
Mortensen discussed above. Further, in the case of Lee, the wife quit her job at her 
husband's request and assisted in the operation of the corporation without receiving pay 
for her work. Lee at 1380. 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the field of 
conflicting decisions regarding awards of gifted, inherited and premarital property in 
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divorce proceedings both in Utah as well as in other jurisdictions. 760 P.2d at 305 - 308. 
The court then announced the rule to be followed by Utah courts when making property 
divisions in divorce cases. Id. at 308. Under that rule courts should generally award 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage to that 
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value unless the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, 
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it. Id. 
The court here asserts that the increase in the value of Mr. Jensen's property is 
marital property because Ms. Jensen contributed to the increase by taking on household 
duties and care of the couple's child. Supplemental Conclusions of Law *f 22. In so 
doing, the court has abused its discretion unless the taking on by a party of such duties by 
law constitutes contribution to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of the other 
party's non-marital property. It is not clear, for instance, how or to what extent Ms. 
Jensen's efforts contributed to the increase. It is not even clear that her efforts 
contributed to such increase. 
POINT IV 
The Trial Court Awarded Attorney Fees Without 
Considering Need, Ability, or Reasonableness 
The trial court awarded attorney fees to Ms. Jensen. However, the trial court 
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made no inquiry nor findings concerning Ms. Jensen's financial need, Mr. Jensen's ability 
to pay, or the reasonableness of the fees. See e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d, 171, 2000 UT 
App 236,^ [30 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (stating, "in awarding attorney fees, the trial court 
must consider the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and 
the reasonableness of the requested fees"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court's award to Kae Jensen of the increase in the 
value of the company stock and attorney fees should be reversed. Appellant, David Leon 
Jensen, asks for an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal. 
V dav DATED this /? 7 y of April, 2007 
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Attorney for the Respondent/Appellant 
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